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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS
OF THE CORPSE IN HOMICIDE CASES
ADMISSIBILITY IN GENERAL
Photographic evidence of persons, places and things is generally ad-
missible in criminal prosecutions.' The fundamental reasoning under-
lying this rule is that photographic evidence is no more than a pictorial
communication of a witness as opposed to or in conjunction with some
other method of communication. 2 This general principle, with what
approaches unanimity,3 has been specifically applied to admit photo-
graphs of the corpse in homicide prosecutions, in the discretion of the
trial court,4 so long as basic requisites of identity5 and relevancy 6 are
I. Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 31 S.E.2d 43 (1946); State v. Myers, 7
NJ. 465, 81 A.2d 710 (1951); Commonwealth v. Boden, 399 Pa. 298, 159 Aid 894 (1960).
See generally 20 AM. JULi Evidence § 728 (1939), Cf. State v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46
S.E.2d 824 (1948), holding that although photographs may not be used as substantive
evidence, a witness may use them for the restricted purpose of explaining or illustrating
relevant testimony.
2. Smith v. State, 27 NJ. 433, 142 A2d 890 (1958). Ligon v. Allen, 157 Ky. 101, 162
S.W. 536 (1914). See also GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE, § 439(h), at 547 (1899).
3. See generally the cases collected in Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 773, 775 (1960); also Annot,
159 A.L.R. 1443 (1945).
4. People v. Schrader, 44 Cal. Rep. 193, 401 Pid 665 (1965); People v. Jenko, 410 Ill
478, 102 N.E.2d 783 (1951); State v. Robinson, 201 S.C. 230, 22 S.E.2d 587 (1942). The
ruling of the trial court will be overturned only when discretion is abused. State v.
Rainey, 149 Me. 92, 99 A2d 78 (1953). Some courts have held the lower courtes action
must be clearly abusive or patently erroneous under the circumstances, Belger v. State,
171 So2d 574 (Fla. 1965). Others have indicated only flagrant abuse warrants reversal,
Commonwealth v. Boden, 399 Pa. 298, 159 A.2d 894 (1960). Even if a ruling is found
to be erroneous reversal is not necessarily warranted. Wisniewski v. State, 51 Del. 84,
138 A.2d 333 (1957).
5. State v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E.2d 824 (1948); Wilson v. State, 94 Ga. App.
588, 95 S.E.2d 733 (1956). In reference to the need to accurately identify photographs
in general see Annot, 9 A.L.R2d 899 (1950). Whether or not a photograph has been
sufficiently verified is a preliminary question of fact for the trial court, Commonwealth
v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E2d 814 (1946). It does not seem necessary that the
person who takes the photographs and the person who develops them be the same,
Black v. State, 215 Ark. 618, 222 S.W2d 816 (1949). Nor, is it necessary that the photo-
graph be taken by a professional photographer, State v. Jones, 52 N.M. 118, 192 P2d
559 (1948). In fact, so long as there are other competent witnesses available to testify
that the photographs are a true representation it is not necessary that the photographer
be identified, People v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 309 P.2d 431 (1957). The condition of
the camera is also immaterial if there is an accurate representation. Jones v. State, 228
Miss. 296, 87 Sold 573 (1956).
6. See Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964). Basic rules of relevance and mate-
riality would seen to apply to photographic evidence of a corpse in a homicide prosecu-
tion as to photographic evidence generally, see Am. Jur. Eidence § 729 (1939). See
also State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961).
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met. Some courts have taken the position that if such evidence is of
probative value and may assist the witnesses in illustrating their testimony
and the jury in ascertaining the truth of the matter and reaching a just
conclusion there is no more reason to exclude photographs of the de-
ceased than any other evidence. 7 In Martin v. Comnonwealth the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia adopted a slightly different ap-
proach yielding the same result. Treating the question of the admissi-
bility of a photograph of the corpse in a criminal case as one of first
impression, the Court found a photograph of a corpse showed no more
than a view of the object itself and should tend to "excite no more
sympathy.or prejudice than the exhibition of a living person with a
bruised, broken and torn body." ' In accordance with the general posi-
don of the courts photographs of the deceased have been held admis-
sible to cast light on motive and intent,10 to show cause of death,11 to
show the atrociousness of the crime, 2 to establish the location and
nature of the injury, 3 to show the condition of the body'4 and for
various other purposes.' 5
LIMITATIONS UPON ADMISSIBILITY
The general rule as to the admissibility of photographs of the corpse
in homicide prosecutions is subject to some limitation. Reference has
7. Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959); see also Alcorta v.
State, 294 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. 1956). Rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 28 (1956).
Cf. State v. Bischert, 131 Mt. 152, 308 P.2d 969 (1957), and Reddish v. State, supra note
6, indicating if introduction of a photograph is not substantially necessary it should be
excluded. See also State v. Tyson, 363 Mo. 1242, 258 S.W.2d 651 (1953).
8. 184 Va. 1009, 37 S.E.2d 43 (1946).
9. Id. at 1022, 37 S.E.2d at 49.
10. People v. Craig, 49 Cal.2d 313, 316 P.2d 947 (1957).
11. Hollin v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. 1957).
12. State v. Turmel, 148 Me. 1, 88 A.2d 367 (1952); see also Timmons v. Common-
wealth 204 Va. 205, 129 S.E.2d 697 (1963), recognizing the rule.
13. State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958). Photographs have been admitted
to show the nature and location of a wound even after an operation attempting to save
the victim's life, Gaddes v. State, 39 Ala. App. 630, 106 So.2d 268 (1958), and after
autopsy, McKeen v. State, 253, 44 So.2d 781 (1949).
14. State v. Smith, 27 N.J. 433, 142 A.2d 890 (1958).
15. Photographs of the deceased have also been admitted to prove the corpus delecti,
State v. Gardner, supra note 1, to identify the victim, Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191
Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950), to prove the character of weapons used, People v. Carter,
48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957), or the manner in which they were used, People v.
Jenko, 410 I11. 478, 102 N.E.2d 783 (1951). Also to refute defendant's plea of self-defense,
Darty v. State, 161 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1964) and accident, Commonwealth v. Davis, 363 Pa.
91, 69 A.2d 123 (1949), as well as to corroborate state witnesses, State v. Ernst, 150 Me.
449, 114 A.2d 369 (1955).
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already been made to the requisites of proper identification and rele-
vancy. 16 These basic requisites are seemingly adhered to in all jurisdic-
tions, 17 and although they may operate to restrict admissibility in any
given case they warrant no further attention. The most significant re-
strictions, to the extent which they exist, relate to the necessity for ad-
mitting the photographs at all and the possibly prejudicial effect they
will have upon the jury if admitted.
NECESSITY FOR ADMISSIBILITY
One of the most prominent objections to admissibility has been that
under the particular circumstances of the case the introduction of
photographs of the corpse is simply unnecessary and superfluous."8
More specifically it has been urged that when the defendant has ad-
mitted the facts to be shown by the photograph,"" or when the photo-
graphic evidence is of a cumulative nature?0 admissibility should be
denied. These arguments rest upon the theory that as photographs of
the body of the victim are of an inherently prejudicial nature the chance
of depriving the defendant of a fair trial, should not be taken un-
necessarily, there being no necessity in the circumstances cited.21
There are some indications of variance in .the manner in which the
courts view objections based upon lack of necessity. In Oxendine v.
State,22 a case in which the defendants made "full" and "complete"
written confessions and admitted the crime in "intricate detail" the Court
reversing the lower tribunal stated:
There was no issue nor controversy as to the cause of death. The de-
fendants admitted the crime in intricate detail. The photos could not
possibly lend assistance in the determination of the defendant's guilt.
It was admitted .... The whole procedure seems to have been so un-
necessary and was highly prejudicial and forces a reversal.23
Similarly, in State v. Robinson,2 4 the Court determined that although
the state would be entitled to introduce photographs if necessary to
16. See cases collected supra at notes 5 and 6.
17. 20 AM. JUR. Evidence § 728-729 (1939).
18. Martin v. Commonwealth, supra note 8.
19. Oxendine v. State, 335 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
20. State v. Upton, 60 N.M. 205, 290 P.2d 440 (1955).
21. Reddish v. State, 167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964).
22. 365 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
23. Id. at 943.
24. 328 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1959). See also Reddish v. State, supra note 20.
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prove facts in issue, the defendant had admitted all facts which may have
been shown by the photographs and it was error to admit them under
such circumstances. However, in State v. Leland,25 even though there
was a confession the Court maintained that so long as a plea of not
guilty stands the State must be allowed to prove its case to the hilt, sub-
ject only to standards of fair play and the rules of evidence. Under a
strict application of this reasoning it is immaterial whether or not the
defendant admitted the facts to be proved by a photograph of the vic-
tim. Photographs of the corpse were also held admissible in State v.
Jones.2 6 In this case the defendant had made a confession and testified
at the trial to substantially the same facts as contained in his confession.
The Court overruled defense counsel's objection that introduction was
unnecessary and found that photographic evidence is often better than
words and served to corroborate state witnesses.
The latter cases could be taken as indicating that pictures of the
corpse are admissible whether or not the defendant has admitted all of
the facts which might be proved by their introduction.27 Most cases
concerning the defendant's admission of facts can be reconciled with
Oxendine and Robinson however, and any differences of result rest
not upon a divergence of rule, but upon factual distinctions. It is to be
noted that in Oxendine "all" of the issues and facts upon which the
photographs bore were admitted by the defendant, while in other
cases only "some" of the facts were admitted and the photographs still
had probative value with relation to facts or issues which had not been
admitted. Thus, in Rivers v. U. S.,2 photographs of the dismembered
body of the deceased were allowed over objection although the de-
fendant admitted the killing, because the Court felt they had relevance
as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's intent and purpose. In
People v. Laverne ° photographs of the deceased were admitted even
though the defendant admitted hitting the deceased and that the de-
ceased died from the injuries he had inflicted, as the pictures were rele-
vant on the issue raised by the defendant's plea of self-defense. In fact,
25. 190 Ore. 598, 227 P.2d 785, aff'd, 343 U.S. 790 rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1951).
26. 52 N.M. 118, 192 P.2d 559 (1948).
27. Annot, 73 A.R.2d 769, § 10 at 809 (1960).
28. State v. Upton, supra note 20, it seems significant to note that in this case the
Court said, "Appellant did not by this admission relieve the state of its entire burden of
proof, for the appellant still stood on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity." id.
at 442.
29. 270 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1959).
30. 148 Cal. App. 2d 605, 307 P.2d 31 (1957).
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it is not at all certain that even Leland and Jones cannot be reconciled
with the Oxendine approach. In Powell v. State l it was decided that
defendant's admissions were not broad enough to operate as a stipulation
of all issues upon which photographs of the deceased bore. Although
the breadth of the confessions in Leland and Jones is not clear, both
cases could fall within the scope of the Powell decision. 2 It is clear,
however, that admissibility will not be denied in any case unless the
defendant admits all issues and facts upon which a photograph of the
deceased may bear.
It is generally held that the mere fact that a photograph of the body of
the deceased is of a cumulative nature will not bar admissibility 3 Thus,
in State v. Helm,3 4 the Court admitted photographic evidence of the de-
ceased although a witness had testified to the facts to be proved by the
photograph saying, "... there is no best evidence rule which excludes
photographic evidence merely because some witness has testified con-
cerning the conditions portrayed in the picture." 3 5 Often a photograph
is clearer and more understandable than other evidence.36 Even if cumu-
lative a photograph may serve other legitimate purposes.37 The test for
determining admissibility is not necessity but whether or not the evi-
dence is relevant.38
In jurisdictions adhering to the "substantial necessity rule," it would
seem a contrary view might obtain. Referring to this rule the Supreme
Court of Louisiana3 9 said:
. . photographs, which are calculated to arouse the sympathies or
prejudices of the jury are properly excluded if they are entirely irrele-
31. 40 Ala. App. 149, 109 So.2d 525 (1959).
32. This seems particularly true in the case of State v. Leland, supra note 25, where
the Court indicated that although there had been a confession the photograph still had
probative value on the question of deliberation and premeditation. In State v. Jones,
supra note 26, however, such a clear case cannot be made.
33. State v. Myers, 7 N.J. 465, 81 A.2d 71 (1961); State v. Walkers, 33 N.J. 580, 166
A.2d 567 (1960); Commonwealth v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 76 A.2d 394 (1950); People v.
LaVerne, supra note 30.
34. 66 Nev. 286, 209 P.2d 187 (1949) quoting Godvig v. Lopez, 185 Ore. 301, 202
P.2d 935 (1949).
35. Id. 209 P.2d at 197.
36. Smith v. State, 216 Ark. 1, 223 S.W.2d 1011 (1949).
37. State v. Jones, supra note 26.
38. People v. Harrison, 59 Cal.2d 622, 381 P.2d 665 (1963).
39. State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 175 So.2d 728 (1963) [Court adopting the language of
23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 852(1) c (1961)].
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vant or not substantially necessary to show material facts and condi-
tions.4o
It is at least questionable whether evidence which is cumulative is
"substantially necessary" in given circumstances.41 In other jurisdictions
the courts follow the rule that photographs should be excluded unless
their probative value outweighs their prejudicial nature.42 Although the
fact that a photograph is cumulative will not act as a bar to admissibility
in these jurisdictions it could well operate as an obstacle, for the cumu-
lative nature of a photograph could well reduce its probative value and
result in exclusion. An examination of the cases, however, did not re-
veal any central tendency to exclude photographic evidence of a corpse
on the basis that the evidence was cumulative in the absence of other
factors. When the cumulative nature of a photograph has been men-
tioned as a ground of exclusion it has usually been in conjunction with
other factors such as admissions by the defendant and the extremely
prejudicial nature of the particular photograph.43
PREJUDICIAL NATURE AS A BAR TO ADMISSIBILITY
The introduction of a photograph of the corpse is often strenuously
challenged by attorneys for the defense on the basis that what it por-
trays,44 the manner in which it portrays,45 or the circumstances under
which it was taken,4 renders it so prejudicial that admission will in-
flame the jurors to such a degree that the defendant will be deprived of
40. Id., 157 So.2d at 731.
41. State v. Tyson, 363 Mo. 1242, 258 S.W.2d 651 (1953), seems to indicate it may
be, however.
42. People v. Modesto, 42 Cal. Rep. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965); State v. DuQuay, 158
Me. 61, 178 A.2d 129 (1962); Born v. State, 397 P.2d 924 (Okla. Crim. 1964).
43. Keifer v. State, 239 Ind. 103, 153 N.E.2d 899 (1958); People v. Jackson, 9 Ill.2d
484, 183 N.E.2d 528 (1956); Dyken v. State, 89 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1956).
44. Objections are often based upon the extremely gruesome or ghastly nature of
photographs, Rivers v. U.S., supra note 29; State v. Beckwith 243 Iowa 841, 53 N.W.2d
867 (1952).
45. Closely related to the subject of note 44 supra, are allegations that photographs
are rendered prejudicial because enlarged or in color. Generally, the courts have taken
the view that so long as the photograph is a true representation, the fact that it is in
color or enlarged is inconsequential. See State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 60 Ohio
Ops. 298, 128 N.E.2d 504 (1955).
46. In State v. De Zeler, 230 Minn. 39, 41 N.W.2d 313 (1950), the Court, over an
objection that three weeks' time had lapsed between death and the time the picture
was taken, found that so long as the photographs were accurate and relevant they should
not be excluded.
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a fair trial.47 If the photograph lacks probative value the courts have
found no problem and there is general agreement that if the primary
or sole purpose of a photograph is to prejudice the jury it should be
excluded. 48 If the photograph possesses probative value, however, the
courts have been forced to reconcile two conflicting principles. Evi-
dence that has probative value and will be of assistance to the jury in
reaching a just verdict should be admitted. It is also true that evidence
of an inherently prejudicial nature should not be admitted. Obviously
when the relevant evidence contains both characteristics a reasonable
choice must be made.
It has been clearly established that photographs will not be refused
admission merely because they have a tendency to inflame the jury,49 or
influence beyond the strict limits for which they are admissible.50 Rele-
vant evidence should not be excluded simply because it may arouse feel-
ings of indignation.51 Any testimony involving the details of a violent
crime could have this tendency, but this should not be allowed to ren-
der it incompetent.52 If the particular photograph serves to clarify -or
establish any material matter it is admissible even though it tends to agi-
tate jurors.53 In State v. DuQuay54 the Court said:
Men and women of standing to be jurors and who have passed into
the jury box are not so weak and untutored that they could be influ-
enced to return a verdict of guilty by reason of the photographs. Sure-
ly the average man and woman is not so far removed from pain
and sorrow, from gruesomeness, from scenes of death and violence and
the like, that photographs such as these would turn the reasoning mind
into dislike of or prejudice against a respondent defending himself in
the halls of justice.r5
If the jury cannot perform its function without being improperly in-
fluenced the jury system is a failure.56
In accordance with the views adhered to by most courts the prevail-
47. Rivers v. U.S., supra note 29.
48. People v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301, 309 P.2d 431 (1957); Commonwealth v. Novak,
395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959).
49. Carson v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964).
50. Oliver v. State, 225 Ark. 809, 286 S.W.2d 17 (1956).
51. People v. Jenko, 410 M. 478, 102 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
52. People v. Jenko, supra note 51.
53. State v. Perkins, 382 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).
54. 158 Me. 61, 178 A.2d 129 (1962).
55. Id., 178 A.2d at 131.
56. State v. Long, 195 Ore. 81, 244 P.2d 1033 (1952).
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ing test with regard to prejudice is whether or not the probative value
of the particular photograph outweighs its prejudicial nature. 57 Each
conflicting principle is given force within defined limits. Theoretically
if the prejudicial nature is at least equal to the probative value admis-
sibility will be denied. Thus, while each of the necessary principles is
allowed to function the defendant is given the benefit of the doubt in
conformity with ideals of justice. Adoption of this rule seems the most
practical and desirable method of providing protection for both de-
fendants and the state.
To say that the rule is the most practical and desirable, however, is not
to say that it is not susceptible of qualifications which call for cautious
observation of its application. Whether or not probative value out-
weighs prejudicial nature rests within the discretion of the trial judge.58
It is obvious that neither factor can be weighed with mathematical ac-
curacy, and as they cannot, any determination of value or weight must
rest upon the subjective evaluation of the individual judge. This situa-
tion is not conducive to uniform application and the courts must be
watchful to insure that all men are equal before the law. A survey of
the cases gives rise to an additional consideration; the operative value
of the test as a restriction upon admissibility. Although the rule as
stated promises adequate protection, the application of the rule is as
important as the rule itself. It is, of course, impossible to determine with
any certainty the manner in which a rule of this nature is being applied
from printed records, but the small number of cases where the preju-
dicial nature of a photograph was considered sufficient to warrant exclu-
sion, in proportion to the number of decided cases may well be a warn-
ing that the rule in application does not provide as much of a restraint
upon the admissibility of highly prejudicial photographs as a reading
of the rules themselves would indicate. In the interest of an equitable
balance between the rights of the state and the rights of the accused the
courts must attempt to insure a reasonable and practical consideration
of highly prejudicial photographs and exercise caution lest minute proba-
tive factors are exploited and assigned undue importance. When society
57. See cases collected supra note 42; Cf. State v. Sherrick, 402 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1965).
Failure of the Court to indicate that probative value has been weighed against the prej-
udicial nature of a photograph may warrant reversal, People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 388
P.2d 892 (1964). Pennsylvania, while adhering to the general rule has adopted an addi-
tional safeguard and requires the Court to caution the jurors against allowing the photo-
graphs to prejudice them, Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 406 Pa. 102, 176 A.2d 421 (1962).
58. People v. Schader, 44 Cal. Rep. 193, 401 P.2d 665 (1965).
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acts to assure reasonable freedom from prejudice it does not act to pro-
tect the guilty, but the innocent; and in protecting the innocent it
protects itself.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that relevant and verified photographs of the corpse are
generally admissible in homicide prosecutions for various purposes.
Limitations upon admissibility vary as to their practical and operative
value. The courts have not looked favorably upon objections based
upon lack of necessity, but this is as it should be. Valuable evidence
cannot be excluded simply because the defendant has admitted some
facts or issues it will serve to prove. If this were the case any relevant
photograph could be excluded in admitting all issues upon which the
photograph had a bearing except those important to the defendant's
case. This could hamstring the state and result in its case remaining un-
proved. Nor, is there any pressing need to exclude photographs merely
because they are cumulative. Only when the photographs are cumulative
and prejudicial is there any reason for concern, and in such cases sound
application of the probative value test will provide adequate protection.
It follows that the limitation upon admissibility of prejudicial photo-
graphs is the most substantial restriction. In this respect the weighing
of probative value against prejudicial nature is the most equitable ap-
proach, and if soundly applied it should serve as a reasonable safeguard
of the defendant's rights. As the rule is inherently susceptible of abuse,
however, the courts must remain vigilant to assure just application.
Stanley L. Moris
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